Some reflections on the justiciability of the peoples’ right to peace by Trindade, Antônio Augusto Cançado
Some refl ections on the 
justiciability of the peoples’ right 
to peace1
Antônio Augusto Cançado Trindade2
Summary:  I. Introduction: Two Signifi cant Antecedents. II. Some 
Disquieting Interrogations. III. Th e Time Dimension: Th e Long-Term Outlook. 
IV. Th e Assertion of the Peoples’ Right to Peace before   Contemporary 
International Courts and Tribunals. 1. Advances of the Case-Law of the Inter-
American Court   of Human Rights. 2. Pleadings before the International Court 
of Justice. 3. Contribution of the Case-Law and Practice in Other International 
Jurisdictions. V. Th e Peoples’ Right to Peace and the Lessons of History.
I. Introduction: Two Signifi cant Antecedents
May I start my address by conveying to the organizers of this event the 
expression of my satisfaction to join you in this journey today, 16 December 
2010, here at the United Nations in Geneva. Two decades have already passed 
since I addressed, in this same U.N. headquarters here in Geneva, the U.N. Global 
Consultation on the Right to Development as a Human Right. On that occasion, on 
the basis of the 1986 U.N. Declaration on the Right to Development, I dwelt 
upon such conceptual aspects as the subjects, legal basis and contents of the right; 
its obstacles and possible means of implementation; and its relationship to other 
human rights. Although I think that much of what I said here in 19903 would 
have a direct bearing on the peoples’ right to peace, it is not my intention to go 
through that again in the current exercise on the peoples’ right to peace.
Reference made to this antecedent, may I only recall that the 1990 U.N. 
Global Consultation proved to be a worthwhile exercise4 following the 1986 U.N. 
Declaration: in fact, in the decade following the formulation of this latter and 
1 Key-Note Address delivered by the Author at the United Nations, in Geneva, on 16 December 2010.
2 Former President of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights; Judge of the International 
Court of Justice (Th e Hague); Emeritus Professor of International Law of the University 
of Brasília (UnB); Honorary Professor of the University of Utrecht; Honorary Fellow of 
the University of Cambridge; Member of the Institut de Droit International, and of the 
Curatorium of the Hague Academy of International Law, and of the Academia Brasileira de 
Letras Jurídicas.
3 A.A. Cançado Trindade, Legal Dimensions of the Right to Development as a Human Right: Some 
Conceptual Aspects, U.N. doc. HR/RD/1990/CONF.36, of 1990 (U.N. Global Consultations 
on the Right to Development as a Human Right), pp. 1-17, esp. p. 13. And, for a detailed 
account of the aforementioned U.N. Global Consultation, cf. A.A. Cançado Trindade, Direito das 
Organizações Internacionais, 4th. ed., Belo Horizonte/Brazil, Ed. Del Rey, 2009, pp. 289-312.
4 Cf. U.N. Centre for Human Rights, Th e Realization of the Right to Development, N.Y., U.N., 
1991, pp. 3-53.
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the 1990 U.N. Global Consultation, the right to development found significant 
endorsements in the final documents adopted by the U.N. World Conferences of 
the nineties, which have brought it into the conceptual universe of International 
Human Rights Law. This seemed to have been the understanding of the U.N. 
General Assembly decision 48/141 (of 20.12.1993, on the creation of the post of 
U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights.), which, in its preamble, reaffirmed 
inter alia that “the right to development is a universal and inalienable right which 
is a fundamental part of the rights of the human person”. 
Before turning to the peoples’ right to peace, may I briefly refer to a second 
significant antecedent of our exercise today, which promptly also comes to my 
memory. While the recent cycle of U.N. World Conferences was taking its course, I 
was privileged to integrate, in 1997, the UNESCO Group of Legal Experts entrusted 
with the preparation of the Draft Declaration on the Human Right to Peace (meetings 
of Las Palmas Island, February 1997; and of Oslo, June 1997). We duly inserted the 
right to peace into the framework of International Human Rights Law5, asserting 
peace as a right and a duty6. After the Las Palmas and Oslo meetings, UNESCO 
launched consultations with 117 member States (Paris, March 1998), at the end of 
which three main positions of the governmental experts became discernible: those 
fully in support of the recognition of the right to peace as a human right, those 
who regarded it rather as a “moral right”, and those to whom it was an “aspiration” 
of human beings7; the main difficulty, as acknowledged by the Report of the Paris 
meeting, was its official recognition as a legal right8. 
It had become clear that that exercise as to the right to peace did not have the same 
outcome as the one pertaining to the right to development. In other words, the 1984 U.N. 
Declaration on the Right of Peoples to Peace9 has not yet generated a significant projection 
as the 1986 U.N. Declaration on the Right to Development. And this, ironically, despite 
the fact that, in a historical perspective, the right to peace has been deeply-rooted in human 
conscience for a much longer period than the right to development (infra). The initiative 
by UNESCO was not the only exercise to that effect.
Outside the framework of international organizations there have been 
initiatives, on the part of persons of good-will, to conceptualize both the right to 
peace10 and the rights of peoples11. This brings me to invoke another element to 
be recalled in the present exercise, namely, the renewed attention dedicated, in the 
recent decades, to the rights of peoples. It is, however, beyond the purposes of my 
intervention today to review the extensive expert writing, the numerous books and 
monographs on distinct idioms, that have elaborated on the rights of peoples.
5 A.A. Cançado Trindade, “The Right to Peace and the Conditions for Peace”, 21 Diálogo - The 
Human Right to Peace: Seed for a Possible Future - UNESCO/Paris ( June 1997) pp. 20-21.
6 The document was prepared as a contribution of UNESCO to the 50th anniversary (in 1998) of 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
7 UNESCO/Executive Board, Report by the Director-General on the Results of the International 
Consultation of Governmental Experts on the Human Right to Peace (Final Report), document 154 
EX/40, of 17.04.1998, p. 10.
8 Cf. ibid., pp. 2 and 10.
9 Annex to the U.N. General Assembly resolution 39/11, of 12 November 1984.
10 E.g., the 2006 Luarca Declaration on the Human Right to Peace, among others.
11 E.g., the 1976 Algiers Declaration on the Rights of Peoples, among others.
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Each one speaks for his own experience, and so do I: my intention, in these 
preliminary remarks, is to recall pertinent exercises in which I was engaged in the last 
two decades, concerning the formulation of the rights to peace and to development 
(supra), including the recent cycle of U.N. World Conferences. I have registered 
and summarized my recollections in this respect in my General Course on Public 
International Law delivered at The Hague Academy of International Law in 2005, 
and published in volumes 316 and 317 of its Recueil des Cours12. May I now pass on 
to the points I wish to make for the current exercise, which gathers us here today. 
II. Some Disquieting Interrogations
In approaching the right of peoples’ to peace, we are first confronted, in my 
perception, with some rather disquieting interrogations. To start with, it is well-
known that the U.N. Charter, adopted in one of the rare moments - if not glimpses 
- of lucidity in the XXth century, proclaimed, in its preamble, the determination of 
“the peoples of the United Nations” to “save succeding generations from the scourge of war”, 
and, to that end, to “live together in peace with each other as good neighbours”.
This phraseology is quite clear: in disclosing the constitutional vocation of the 
U.N. Charter, its draftsmen referred to the peoples, rather than the States, of the 
United Nations. Why, then, has it taken so much time for the legal profession to 
acknowledge such constitutional conception of the U.N. Charter (further evidenced 
by some key provisions as Articles 2(6) and 103 of the Charter), as it has increasingly 
been doing lately, in recent years? Why has it approached the Charter, for a long 
time, from a strictly reductionist - if not surpassed - inter-State perspective?
Why have the debates with the U.N. system as a whole, on the human right to 
peace, proved inconclusive to date? Why has a been so difficult to reach consensus 
in relation to something which looks prima facie so evident? Is it possible that States 
remain so oversensitive - perhaps more than human beings - when it comes to 
what they regard as presumably touching on their so-called vital interests? Why so 
many years have lapsed since the adoption of the 1984 Declaration on the Right 
of Peoples to Peace till the subject has now seemingly been rescued by the Human 
Rights Council earlier this year13 for reconsideration in the present workshop?
Unfortunately, recourse to armed force seems to have pervaded large segments 
of public opinion, and even - and most regrettably - of the legal doctrine and 
profession itself (particularly those coopted by the power-holders). Why, - it can 
further been asked, - has it taken so much time to come to a universally acceptable 
definition of aggression? Why so, despite the fact that since the twenties, in the 
old League of Nations, there were endeavours to that effect? Why the tipification 
of the crime of aggression has not yet been achieved, despite the fact that one 
12 Cf., as to the rights to peace and to development, A.A. Cançado Trindade, “International Law 
for Humankind: Towards a New Jus Gentium - General Course on Public International Law - 
Part I”, 316 Recueil des Cours de l’Académie de Droit International de la Haye (2005), chapter XIV, 
pp. 397-411; and cf., as to the recent cycle of U.N. World Conferences, A.A. Cançado Trindade, 
“International Law for Humankind: Towards a New Jus Gentium -General Course on Public 
International Law - Part II”, 317 Recueil des Cours de l’Académie de Droit International de la Haye 
(2005), chapter XXVI, pp. 247-268.
13 U.N. Human Rights Council, doc. A/HRC/11/L.7, of 12.06.2009, pp. 1-5.
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could have built on the 1974 U.D. Definition of Aggression, itself adopted after 
years of debates?
Why does the proclamation of the peoples’ right to peace remains an unfinished 
business in the United Nations system, after so many years, and despite some relevant 
provisions of the U.N. Charter itself? Why has humanitarian law not yet evolved to the 
point of banning war altogether? Why has the topic of international trade in weapons never 
occupied a more prominent or conspicuous place in the agenda of the U.N. competent 
organs? I am afraid there are no easy answers to these apparently simple, but disquieting 
questions. There are to be kept constantly in mind. They have probably more to do with 
the inscrutable human nature itself. It so seems that States experience an unsurmountable 
difficulty to speak a common language, when it comes to reach an understanding as to 
the fundamentals to secure the very survival of humankind. With this warning in mind, 
I move on to the next point of consideration, namely, the time dimension.
III. The Time Dimension: The Long-Term Outlook
Despite the difficulties experienced so far, the renewal of interest in, and 
the insistence upon, the right of peoples’ to peace, by the U.N. Human Rights 
Council, are most commendable. That right can, in effect, be appropriately 
approached, bearing in mind the time dimension. Its roots can be traced back 
to the search for peace, antedating for a long time the adoption of the U.N. 
Charter. In fact, the search for peace, and the construction of the right to peace, 
have historical roots that were to become notorious with the projects of perpetual 
peace of the XVIIIth century, such as those of Saint-Pierre (1712) and of I. Kant 
(1795). Yet, such projects proved incapable to date to accomplish their common 
ideal, precisely for laying too heavy an emphasis, in their endeavours to restrict 
and abolish wars, specifically on inter-State relations, overlooking the bases for 
peace within each State14 and the role of non-State entities. 
It may appear somewhat surprising that the search for peace has not yet 
sufficiently related domestic and international levels, this latter going beyond a strictly 
inter-State dimension. Recent attempts to elaborate on the right to peace have, 
however, displayed a growing awareness that its realization is ineluctably linked to the 
achievement of social justice within and between nations15. Along the XXth century, 
the conceptual construction of the right to peace in International Law has antecedents 
in successive initiatives taken, in distinct contexts at international level16. 
14 The project of Kant (cf. I. Kant, Sobre la Paz Perpetua [1795], 4th. ed., Madrid, Tecnos, 1994, pp. 
3-69) at least sought to establish a link between inter-State and the internal constitution of each State. 
On the insufficiencies of the classic endeavours to abolish wars sic et simpliciter, cf. G. del Vecchio, El 
Derecho Internacional y el Problema de la Paz (Spanish edition of the original Il Diritto Internazionale e 
il Problema della Pace), Barcelona, Bosch, 1959, pp. 51-52, 62-64, 67 and 121-123.
15 Cf. ibid., pp. 52, 63-64 and 151; A.A. Cançado Trindade, O Direito Internacional em um Mundo 
em Transformação, Rio de Janeiro, Ed. Renovar, 2002, p. 1062.
16 Cf., generally, D. Uribe Vargas, El Derecho a la Paz, Bogotá, Universidad Nacional de Colombia, 
1996, pp. 1-250; D. Uribe Vargas, “El Derecho a la Paz”, in Derecho Internacional y Derechos 
Humanos/Droit international et droits de l’homme (eds. D. Bardonnet and A.A. Cançado 
Trindade), The Hague/San José of Costa Rica, IIDH/Hague Academy of International Law 
(1995 External Session), 1996, pp. 177-195.
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Reference can be made, in this connection, e.g., to the 1928 General Treaty 
for the Renunciation of War (the so-called Briand-Kellog Pact)17; Articles 1 and 
2(4) of the U.N. Charter18, complemented by the 1970 U.N. Declaration on 
Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation 
among States19; the 1970 Declaration on the Strengthening of International 
Security20; the 1974 Definition of Aggression21; the 1974 Charter on Economic 
Rights and Duties of States22; the Code of Offences against the Peace and Security 
of Mankind, drafted by the U.N. International Law Commission; successive 
resolutions of the U.N. General Assembly pertaining to the right to peace23, and 
relating it to disarmament; the 2000 U.N. Millenium Declaration followed by 
the 2005 World Summit Outcome24. Yet, the debates conducive to the adoption 
of those instruments were again conducted to a large extent from a horizontal, 
inter-State perspective.
Going well beyond that, in excerpts from the writings of a former recipient 
of the Nobel Prize in literature, written at the end of the first world war, and only 
published, posthumously, in the early 70s, and not so well-known as his literary 
writings, it was pondered that
“(...) La paix en tant que pensée et aspiration, en tant  que but et idéal, 
est déjà très vieille. Cela fait déjà des millénaires qu’existe cette puissante 
parole, fondamentales pour des millénaires: `Tu ne tueras point´. (...)
Il y a quelques milliers d’années la loi religieuse d’un peuple de haute 
culture a édicté le principe fondamental du `Tu ne tueras pas´. (...) 
La loi que Moïse a formulée sur le mont Sinai est reprise quelques 
milliers d’années plus tard (...) avec des restrictions (...). Nul pays de 
culture au monde n’a repris dans son code pénal l’interdiction de tuer 
des hommes sans la restreindre». (...)
17 Endeavouring to overcome the dangerous system of the equilibrium of forces by condemning war as 
an means of settlement of disputes and an instrument of foreign policy, and heralding the new system 
of collective security and the emergence of the right to peace; J. Zourek, L’interdiction de l’emploi de la 
force en Droit international, Leiden/Genève, Sijthoff/Inst. H.-Dunant, 1974, pp. 39-48.
18 The relevant U.N. provisions. together with the 1928 General Treaty for the Renunciation of 
War, became major sources - the legal nature of which was unchallenged by States - of limitations 
of resort to force by States; I. Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force by States, Oxford, 
Clarendon Press, 1963 (reprint 1981), pp. 83 and 91. 
19 U.N. General Assembly resolution 2625 (XXV), of 24.10.1970.
20 U.N. General Assembly resolution 2374 (XXV), of 16.12.1970. 
21 U.N. General Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX), of 14.12.1974.
22 Which acknowledged the States’ duty to coexist in peace and to achieve disarmament (Articles 
26 and 15, respectively). Other international instruments have done the same (e.g., the 1982 
World Charter for Nature, preamble, par. 4(c), and Principles 5 and 20). It has often been 
argued that the right to peace entails as a corollary the right to disarmament. 
23 U.N. General Assembly resolution 33/73, “Declaration on the Preparation of Society to Live 
in Peace”, of 15.12.1978; U.N. General Assembly resolution 39/11, “Declaration on the Right 
of Peoples to Peace”, of 12.11.1984; cf. also U.N. General Assembly resolution 34/88, of 1979.
24 Cf., on these latter, A.A. Cançado Trindade, Direito das Organizações Internacionais, 4th ed., 
Belo Horizonte/Brazil, Edit. Del Rey, 2009, pp. 545-555. 
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(...) La forme la plus grave de `combat´ est la forme organisée par l’État 
(...) et son corollaire: la philosophie de l’État, du capital, de l’industrie 
et de l’homme faustien (...). J’ai toujours été pour les opprimés contre 
les oppresseurs»25.
In the profession of his pacifist ideals, Hermann Hesse added lucidly that
“Ce principe du `Tu ne tueras point´, à l’époque où il fut énoncé, 
représentait une exigence d’une portée inouïe. Cette parole signifiait 
pratiquement la même chose que ` Tu ne respireras pas!´. Apparemment 
c’était impossible,apparemment c’était dément (...). Toutefois, cette 
parole s’est maintenue au cours de nombreux siècles et aujourd’hui 
encore elle est valide, elle a fondé des lois, des opinions, des morales, 
elle a porté ses fruits, a secoué et labouré la vie des hommes comme 
peu d’autres paroles. (...) Il y a eu des progrès et des régressions. Il y eu 
des pensées lumineuses à partir desquelles nous avons construit des lois 
sombres et des cavernes de la conscience. (...)
Le précepte `Tu ne tueras pas´ a été fidèlement honoré et suivi depuis 
des milliers d’années par des milliers d’individus. (...) Il y a toujours eu 
une minorité des gens bien intentionnées, de croyants de l’avenir qui 
ont suivi des lois qui ne se trouvaient dans aucun code pénal profane. 
(...) Des milliers d’individus se sont réclamés de los supérieures non 
écrites (...), et se sont courageusement levés contre l’obligation de tuer 
et de haïr, acceptant d’aller en prison et d’être persécutés pour cela»26.
The exercise to which we devote ourselves today, here at the United 
Nations in Geneva, in retaking for examination the right of peoples to peace, 
is thus nothing new. There is nothing new under the sun. The purpose of 
our debate corresponds to an ancient human aspiration, which has been 
present in human conscience along the centuries. As observed by another 
remarkable writer of the XXth century, each war, however brief, with the 
unethical recourse to unlimited force and violence, with the «hypothetical 
justification of its necessity», with the hypocrisy of alleged preoccupation 
with those fallen in combat, with its prayers to the flag and the homeland 
(patria), with its waging of uncontrolled violence and extermination, destroys 
in a short while what was supposed to be achievements of social organization, 
if not civilization, along centuries27.
Fortresses, castles, temples and cathedrals, built in the course of decades, were 
destroyed in hours, if not minutes, - but not the idiom, not the oral history, not 
the religious beliefs, not the secular human aspiration to peace; these latter seem 
to emerge like phoenix, rising from the ashes with renewed youth. This can hardly 
be surprising, as “the spirit is stronger than the matter”28. The more we go back in 
25Hermann Hesse, Guerre et paix, Paris, L’Arche Éd., 2003 [reed.], pp. 35, 49, 127 and 115.
26 Ibid., pp. 35-36 and 50.
27 Stefan Zweig, Tiempo y Mundo - Impresiones y Ensayos (1904-1940), Barcelona, Edit. Juventud, 
1998 [reed.], pp. 60-61.
28 Ibid., p. 247.
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time, the more this appears to be confirmed. Yet, in our days, the awareness of the 
imperatives of peace does not seem to have evolved pari passu with the impressive 
development of specialized knowledge and technological advances. 
In the mid-XXth century, the learned historian Arnold Toynbee warned 
that the then growing expenditures with militarism fatally lead to the “ruin of the 
civilizations”29; likewise, the improvement of military technique is symptomatic 
of the “decline of a civilization”30. Such growing expenditures of his time keep on 
going on, in our days, six decades later, amidst apparent inconscience. Another 
distinguished writer of the XXth century, Stefan Zweig, in referring to the “old 
barbarism of war”, likewise warned against the décalage between technical progress 
and moral ascension, in face of “a catastrophe which with one sole blow made us 
regress a thousand years in our humanitarian efforts”31.
Has the previous generation really grasped the lessons learned with so 
much suffering by previous generations? It does not seem so. Another remarkable 
thinker of the last century, Bertrand Russell, pondered in 1959, in relation to the 
production of the atom bomb, that
“(...) The pursuit of knowledge may become harmful unless its 
combined with wisdom (...). There must be (...) a certain awareness of 
the ends of human life. (...) 
(...) I do not think that knowledge and morals ought to be much 
separated. It is true that the kind of specialised knowledge which is 
required for various kinds of skill has little to do with wisdom. (...) 
With every increase of knowledge and skill, wisdom becomes more 
necessary, for every such increase augments our capacity for realising our 
purposes, and therefore augments our capacity for evil, if our purposes 
are unwise. ;;the world needs wisdom as it has never needed it before; 
and if knowledge continues to increase, the world will need wisdom in 
the future even more than it does now”32.
Going further back in time, in the XVIth century, Francisco de Vitoria 
conceived the jus gentium of his days as the one which regulated the relations 
among all peoples (including the indigenous peoples of the New World), besides 
the individuals, in conditions of independence and juridical equality, pursuant to 
a truly universalist outlook (totus orbis). In a world marked by the diversification 
(of peoples and cultures) and by the pluralism (of ideas and cosmovisions), this 
new jus gentium33, emanated from a lex praeceptiva of natural law, ensuing from 
the recta ratio, secured the unity of the societas gentium, and provided the juridical 
29 A. Toynbee, Guerra e Civilização, Lisbon, Edit. Presença, 1963 [reed.], pp. 20 and 29. 
30 Ibid., pp. 178-179. - And cf. J. de Romilly, La Grèce antique contre la violence, Paris, Éd. Fallois, 
2000, pp. 18-19 and 129-130.
31 S. Zweig, O Mundo que Eu Vi, Rio de Janeiro, Ed. Record, 1999 (reed.), p. 19, and cf. pp. 474 
and 483, and cf. p. 160. 
32 Bertrand Russell, “Knowledge and Wisdom”, in Essays in Philosophy (ed. H. Peterson), N.Y. 
Pocket Library, 1960 [reed.], pp. 499 and 502.
33Defined by Francisco de Vitoria himself as “quod naturalis ratio inter omnes gentes constituit, 
vocatur jus gentium”.
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foundation for the totus orbis. In his well-known Relectio De Indis Prior, Vitoria 
clarified his understanding of the jus gentium as a law regulating the relations 
among all peoples, with the due respect to their rights, to the territories where 
they lived, to their contacts and freedom of movement (jus communicationis)34.
Going still further back in time, already the ancient Greeks were aware of the 
devastating effects of war over winners and losers, revealing the great evil of the substitution 
of the ends by the means: since the epoch of the Illiad of Homer until nowadays, all the 
“belligerents” were transformed into means, in things, in the insensitive struggle for power, 
incapable event to “submit their actions to their thoughts”. As Simone Weil observed 
so perspicaciously, the terms “oppressors and oppressed” almost lose meaning, in face of 
the impotence of all in confronting the machinery of war, converted into a machinery 
of destruction of any reasoning and of the fabrication of the inconscience35. Like in the 
Illiad of Homer, there are no winners and losers, all are taken and overwhelmed by force, 
possessed by war, degraded by brutalities and massacres36.
IV. The Assertion of the Peoples’ Right to Peace before 
Contemporary International Courts and Tribunals
Despite the fact that human knowledge has not been accompanied by wisdom 
in the handling of the matters of concern to the whole of humankind, there is no 
reason for despair. Some modest advances seem to have been achieved by human 
conscience, - or by the universal juridical conscience, as, in my own conception, the 
ultimate material source of International Law, the jus gentium37. In effect, nowadays, 
the rights of peoples are acknowledged and asserted before contemporary international 
tribunals. Here, once again, I will speak for my own experience, in referring first to 
the recent case-law of the tribunal I have served for many years, namely the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights. I will then turn to the past practice before the 
tribunal I now serve, namely, the International Court of Justice. 
1. Advances of the Case-Law of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights
In its Judgment of 31.08.2001, without precedents in international case-law, 
in the case of the Community Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni versus Nicaragua, the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) extended protection to the right 
of all the members of an indigenous community (as the complaining party) to their 
34 From his work emerged the conception of a jus gentium, entirely emancipated from its origin of 
private law (in Roman law), vested with a humanistic vision, respectful of the freedoms of nations 
as well as of individuals, and of universal ambit. A.A. Cançado Trindade, “Totus Orbis: A Visão 
Universalista e Pluralista do Jus Gentium: Sentido e Atualidade da Obra de Francisco de Vitoria”, in 
24 Revista da Academia Brasileira de Letras Jurídicas - Rio de Janeiro (2008) n. 32, pp. 197-212.
35S. Weil, Reflexiones sobre las Causas de la Libertad y de la Opresión Social, Barcelona, Ed. Paidós/
Universidad Autónoma de Barcelona, 1995, pp. 81-82, 84 and 130-131. 
36 S. Weil, “L’Iliade ou le Poème de la Guerre (1940-1941)” in Oeuvres, Paris, Quarto Gallimard, 
1999, pp. 527-552.
37 A.A. Cançado Trindade, International Law for Humankind - Towards a New Jus Gentium, 1st. 
ed., Leiden/The Hague, Nijhoff/The Hague Academy of International Law , 2010, pp. 1-726.
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communal property of their historical lands38. The IACtHR determined that the 
respondent State should proceed39 to the delimitation, demarcation and emission of 
the title to those lands of the community Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni taking into 
account their customary law, their uses and customs40. This remarkable Judgment 
eloquently discloses the contemporaneity of the thought of Francisco de Vitoria.
Shortly after this leading case in the jurisprudence of the Inter-American 
Court, three other decisions had a direct bearing on the rights of peoples, their 
cultural identity and their very survival: its Judgments on the cases of the Indigenous 
Community Yakye Axa versus Paraguay (2005-2006), of the Indigenous Community 
Sawhoyamaxa versus Paraguay (2005-2006), and of the massacre of the Moiwana 
Community versus Suriname (2005-2006)41. The first two cases of this triad, those 
of the Indigenous Communities Yakye Axa and Sawhoyamaxa, pertained to the 
forced displacement of the members of two indigenous communities out of their 
lands (as a result of State-sponsored commercialization of such lands), and their 
survival at the border of a road in conditions of extreme poverty.
They in fact concerned their fundamental right to life lato sensu, comprising 
their cultural identity, as I pointed out in my Separate Opinion (par. 8) in the 
case of the Indigenous Community Yakye Axa (Interpretation of Judgment, of 
06.02.2006), wherein I further warned:
“One cannot live in constant uprootedness and abandonment. The human 
being has the spiritual need of roots. The members of traditional communities 
value particularly their lands, that they consider that belongs to them, just as, 
in turn, they ` belong’ to their lands. In the present case, the definitive return 
of the lands to the members of the Community Yakye Axa is a necessary 
form of reparation, which moreover protects and preserves their own cultural 
identity and, ultimately, their fundamental right to life lato sensu” (par. 14). 
 
Shortly afterwards, in the other case of the Indigenous Community Sawhoyamaxa 
(Judgment of 29.03.2006), in my Separate Opinion I saw it fit to add:
“The concept of culture, - originated from the Roman `colere ,´ meaning 
to cultivate, to take into account, to care and preserve, - manifested itself, 
38 Against the exploitation of wood in their lands by a multinational which had obtained a licence 
to that end from the Nicaraguan Government.
39 In the light of Article 21 of the American Convention on Human Rights.
40 A.A. Cançado Trindade, “The Case-Law of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights: An 
Overview”, in Studi di Diritto Internazionale in Onore di G. Arangio-Ruiz, vol. III, Napoli, Edit. 
Scientifica, 2004, pp. 1881, and cf. pp. 1873-1898. The IACtHR pondered, inter alia, that “for 
the indigenous communities the relationship with the land is not merely a question of possession 
and production but rather a material and spiritual element that they ought to benefit fully from, 
so as to preserve their cultural legacy and transmit it to future generations” (par. 141).
41For a study, cf. A.A. Cançado Trindade, “The Right to Cultural Heritage in the Evolving 
Jurisprudential Construction of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights”, in Multiculturalism 
and International Law - Essays in Honour of E. McWhinney (eds. Sienho Yee and J.-Y. Morin), 
Leiden, Nijhoff, 2009, pp. 477-499.
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originally, in agriculture (the care with the land). With Cicero, the concept 
came to be used for questions of the spirit and of the soul (cultura animi)42. 
With the passing of time, it came to be associated with humanism, with the 
attitude of preserving and taking care of the things of the world, including those 
of the past43. The peoples - the human beings in their social milieu - develop 
and preserve their cultures to understand, and to relate with, the outside world, 
in face of the mystery of life. Hence the importance of cultural identity, as a 
component or aggregate of the fundamental right to life itself” (par. 4.)44.
The Inter-American Court’s Judgment of 15.06.2005 in the case of the 
Moiwana Community versus Suriname (merits and reparations) addressed the 
massacre of the N’djukas of the Moiwana village and the drama of the forced 
displacement of the survivors. The Court duly valued the relationship of the 
N’djukas in Moiwana with their traditional land, having warned that”larger 
territorial land rights are vested in the entire people, according to N’djuka 
custom; community members consider such rights to exist in perpetuity and to 
be unalienable” (par. 86(6)). The Court’s Judgment ordered a series of measures 
of reparations45, including measures to foster the voluntary return of the displaced 
persons to their original lands and communities, in Suriname, respectively. The 
delimitation, demarcation and the issuing of title of the communal lands of the 
N’djukas in the Moiwana Community, as a form of non-pecuniary reparation, 
has much wider repercussions than one may prima facie assume. 
In my extensive Separate Opinion (pars. 1-93) which accompanied that 
Judgment, I recalled what the surviving members of the Moiwana Community 
pointed out before the Court (in the public hearing of 09.09.2004), namely, that 
the massacre at issue perpetrated in Suriname in 1986, planned by the State, has 
“destroyed the cultural tradition (...) of the Maroon communities in Moiwana” 
(par. 80)46. Duties of respect for the relationships of the living with their dead, 
- I pointed out (pars. 60-61), - were present in the origins of the law of nations 
itself, as remarked, in the XVIIth century, by Hugo Grotius in chapter XIX of 
book II of his classic work De Jure Belli ac Pacis (1625), dedicated to the “right 
to burial”, inherent to all human beings, in conformity with a precept of “virtue 
42 H. Arendt, Between Past and Future, N.Y., Penguin, 1993 [reprint], pp. 211-213.
43Ibid., pp. 225-226.
44 Moreover, in the same Separate Opinion, I further stressed the “close and ineluctable 
relationship” between the right to life lato sensu and cultural identity (as one of its components). 
In so far as members of indigenous communities are concerned, - I added, “cultural identity 
is closely linked to their ancestral lands. If they are deprived of these latter, as a result of 
their forced displacement, their cultural identity is seriously affected, and so is, ultimately, 
their very right to life lato sensu, that is, the right to life of each one and of all the members 
of each community” (par. 28). When this occurs, they are driven into a situation of “great 
vulnerability”, of social maginalization and abandonment, as in the cas d’espèce (par. 29).
45 Comprising indemnizations as well as non-pecuniary reparations of distinct kinds.
46 Ever since this has tormented them; they were unable to give a proper burial to the mortal 
remains of their beloved ones, and underwent the strains of uprootedness, a human rights 
problem confronting the universal juridical conscience in our times (pars. 13-22). Their 
suffering projected itself in time, for almost two decades (pars. 24-33). In their culture, 
mortality had an inescapable relevance to the living, the survivors (pars. 41-46), who had 
duties towards their dead (pars. 47-59).
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and humanity”47. And the principle of humanity itself, - as well recalled by the 
learned jusphilosopher Gustav Radbruch, - owes much to ancient cultures, having 
associated itself, with the passing of time, with the very spiritual formation of the 
human beings48.
 In the present case of the Moiwana Community, beyond moral damage, I 
sustained in my aforementioned Separate Opinion the configuration of a true 
spiritual damage (elaborated in pars. 71-81), and, beyond the right to a project of 
life, I dared to identify and attempted to conceptualize what I termed the right to a 
project of after-life (pars. 67-70). I further observed, in my Separate Opinion, that 
the testimonial evidence produced before the Court in the cas d’espèce indicated 
that, in the N’djukas cosmovision, in circumstances like those of the present 
case, “the living and their dead suffer together, and this has an intergenerational 
projection”, and implications for the kinds of reparations due, also in the form of 
satisfaction (e.g., honouring the dead in the persons of the living) (par. 77). 
In fact, the expert evidence produced before the Court indeed referred 
expressly to “spiritually-caused illnesses”49. I then concluded, in my Separate 
Opinion, on this particular point:
“All religions devote attention to human suffering, and attempt to provide 
the needed transcendental support to the faithful; all religions focus on the 
relations between life and death, and provide distinct interpretations and 
explanations of human destiny and after-life50. Undue interferences in human 
beliefs - whatever religion they may be attached to - cause harm to the faithful, 
and the International Law of Human Rights cannot remain indifferent to such 
harm. It is to be duly taken into account, like other injuries, for the purpose 
of redress. Spiritual damage, like the one undergone by the members of the 
Moiwana Community, is a serious harm, requiring corresponding reparation, 
of the (non-pecuniary) kind I have just indicated. (...)
The N’djukas had their right to the project of life, as well as their right to 
the project of after-life, violated, and continuously so, ever since the State-
planned massacre perpetrated in the Moiwana village on 29.11.1986. They 
suffered material and immaterial damages, as well as spiritual damage. Some 
of the measures of reparations ordered by the Court in the present Judgment 
duly stand against oblivion, so that this atrocity never occurs again. (...) 
In sum, the wide range of reparations ordered by the Court in the present 
Judgment in the Moiwana Community case  (...) has concentrated on, 
and enhanced the centrality of, the position of the victims (...). In the cas 
d’espèce, the collective memory of the Maroon N’djukas is hereby duly 
preserved, against oblivion, honouring their dead, thus safeguarding their 
right to life lato sensu, encompassing the right to cultural identity, which 
finds expression in their acknowledged links of solidarity with their dead” 
(pars. 81 and 91-92).
47 H. Grotius, Del Derecho de la Guerra y de la Paz [1625], vol. III (books II and III), Madrid, Edit. 
Reus, 1925, pp. 39, 43 and 45, and cf. p. 55.
48 G. Radbruch, Introducción a la Filosofía del Derecho, 3rd. ed., Mexico/Buenos Aires, Fondo de 
Cultura Económica, 1965, pp. 153-154.
49 Paragraphs 77(e) and 83(9) of the Court’s Judgment.
50 Cf., e.g., [Various Authors,] Life after Death in World Religions, Maryknoll N.Y., Orbis, 1997, 
pp. 1-124.
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It should not pass unnoticed that, in the case of the Moiwana Community, 
the Court indicated, in the section on proven facts of the present Judgment, that
“During the European colonization of present-day Suriname in the XVIIth 
century, Africans were forcefully taken to the region and used as slaves on 
the plantations. Many of these Africans, however, managed to escape to the 
rainforest areas in the eastern part of Suriname’s present national territory, 
where they established new and autonomous communities (...). Eventually, 
six distinct groups of Maroons emerged: the N’djuka, the Matawai, the 
Saramaka, the Kwinti, the Paamaka, and the Boni or Aluku.
These six communities individually negotiated peace treaties with the colonial 
authorities. The N’djuka treaty signed a treaty in 1760 that established their 
freedom from slavery51. In 1837, this treaty was renewed; the terms of 
the agreement permitted the N’djuka to continue to reside in their settled 
territory and determined the boundaries of that area. The Maroons generally 
- and the N’djuka in particular – consider these treaties still to be valid and 
authoritative with regard to their relationship with the State, despite the fact 
that Suriname secured its independence from the Netherlands in 1975”52. 
In my aforementioned Separate Opinion in the cas d’espèce, I dedicated a 
section to the legal subjectivity of peoples in nternational law (pars. 5-12), given the 
importance which I ascribed to the fact that the rights of a people preceded historically 
statehood itself. As I pondered, in this particular respect, in my Separate Opinion,
“more than two centuries before Suriname attained statehood, its Maroon 
peoples celebrated peace agreements with the colonial authorities, 
subsequently renewed, and thus obtained their freedom from slavery. 
And the Maroons, - the N’djuka in particular, - regard these treaties as 
still valid and authoritatives in the relations with the successor State, 
Suriname. This means that those peoples exercised their attributes of 
legal persons in international law, well before the territory where they 
lived acquired statehood. This reinforces the thesis which I have always 
supported, namely, that the State are not, and have never been, the sole 
and exclusive subjects of international law. 
This purely inter-State outlook was forged by positivism, as from the 
Vattelian reductionism in the mid-XVIIIth century53, and became en vogue 
in the late XIXth century and early XXth century54, with the well-known 
51Slavery was not formally abolished in the region until 1863. 
52 Paragraph 83(1) and (2).
53Found in the work by E. de Vattel, Le Droit des gens ou Principes de la loi naturelle appliquée à la 
conduite et aux affaires des nations et des souverains (1758); cf., e.g., E. Jouannet, Emer de Vattel et 
l’émergence doctrinale du Droit international classique, Paris, Pédone, 1998, pp. 255, 311, 318-
319, 344 and 347.
54For a criticism of State-consent theories, reflecting the dangerous voluntarist-positivist conception 
of international law, cf. A.A. Cançado Trindade, «The Voluntarist Conception of International 
Law: A Re-Assessment», 59 Revue de droit international de sciences diplomatiques et politiques 
- Geneva (1981) pp. 201-240.
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disastrous consequences - the successive atrocities perpetrated in distinct 
regions of the world against human beings individually and collectively - 
that marked the tragic and abhorrent history of the XXth century. However, 
since its historical origins in the XVIth century, the law of nations (droit des 
gens, derecho de gentes, direito das gentes) encompassed not only States, 
but also peoples, and the human person, individually and in groups), and 
humankind as a whole55. 
In this respect, reference can be made, for example, to the inspiring work 
by Francisco de Vitoria56, particularly his De Indis - Relectio Prior (1538-
1539)57. In his well-known Salamanca lectures De Indis (chapters VI and VII), 
Vitoria clarified his understanding of jus gentium as a law for all, individuals 
and peoples as well as States, “every fraction of humanity”58. In the XVIIth 
century, in the days of Hugo Grotius (De Jure Belli ac Pacis, 1625), likewise, 
the jus humanae societatis, conceived as a universal one, comprised States as 
well as peoples and individuals59. It is important to rescue this universalist 
outlook, in the current process of humanization of international law and of 
construction of the new jus gentium of the XXIst century. (...) 
Human beings, individually and collectively, have emerged as subjects 
of international law. The rights protected disclose an individual and a 
collective or social dimensions, but it is the human beings, members 
of such minorities or collectivities, who are, ultimately, the titulaires of 
those rights. This approach was espoused by the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights in the unprecedented decision (the first pronouncement 
of the kind by an international tribunal) in the case of the Community 
Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni versus Nicaragua (2001), which 
safeguarded the right to communal property of their lands (under Article 
21 of the American Convention on Human Rights) of the members of a 
whole indigenous community60. 
55A.A. Cançado Trindade,- «La Humanización del Derecho Internacional y los Límites de 
la Razón de Estado», 40 Revista da Faculdade de Direito da Universidade Federal de Minas 
Gerais - Belo Horizonte/Brazil (2001) pp. 11-23; A.A. Cançado Trindade, «A Personalidade 
e Capacidade Jurídicas do Indivíduo como Sujeito do Direito Internacional», in Jornadas de 
Direito Internacional (Ciudad de México, Dec. 2001), Washington D.C., OAS Subsecretariat 
of Legal Affairs, 2002, pp. 311-347; and cf. A.A. Cançado Trindade, «Vers la consolidation de la 
capacité juridique internationale des pétitionnaires dans le système interaméricain des droits de 
la personne», 14 Revue québécoise de droit international (2001) n. 2, pp. 207-239. 
56Francisco de Vitoria, Relecciones del Estado, de los Indios, y del Derecho de la Guerra (with an 
Introduction by A. Gómez Robledo), 2nd. ed., Mexico, Ed. Porrúa, 1985, pp. XXX, XLIV-XLV, 
LXXVII and 61, and cf. pp. LXII-LXIII. 
57Francisco de Vitoria, De Indis - Relectio Prior (1538-1539), in: Obras de Francisco de Vitoria - 
Relecciones Teológicas (ed. T. Urdanoz), Madrid, BAC, 1960, p. 675. 
58J. Brown Scott, The Spanish Origin of International Law - Francisco de Vitoria and his Law of 
Nations, Oxford/London, Clarendon Press/H. Milford - Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace, 1934, pp. 140 and 170.
59 Cf. H. Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pacis (1625), The Hague, Nijhoff, 1948, pp. 6, 10 and 84-85; 
and P.P. Remec, The Position of the Individual in International Law according to Grotius and Vattel, 
The Hague, Nijhoff, 1960, pp. 203, 216-217 and 219-220.
60The Court pondered, in paragraph 141 of its Judgment (merits), that to the members of the 
indigenous communities (such as the present one) “the relationship with the land is not merely a 
question of possession and production but rather a material and spiritual element that they ought 
to enjoy fully, so as to preserve their cultural legacy and transmit it to future generations”.
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In this respect, the endeavours undertaken in both the United Nations 
and the Organization of American States (OAS), along the nineties, 
to reach the recognition of indigenous peoples’ rights through their 
projected and respective Declarations, pursuant to certain basic 
principles (such as, e.g., that of equality and non-discrimination), have 
emanated from human conscience. (...)” (pars. 6-8 and 10-11).
In addition to those cases, another significant legal development can 
be found in the determination, by the Inter-American Court, of grave violations of 
human rights, and the corresponding reparations in various forms, under the American 
Convention, in a recent cycle of cases of massacres (of which the case of the Moiwana 
Community, supra, forms part). Some of the occurrences victimized likewise members of 
specific communities or human collectivities. In a recent lecture I delivered, last month, 
in an international symposium convened by the International Criminal Court (ICC) 
at The Hague (on 10.11.2009), I referred to the IACtHR’s Judgments in the cases of 
the massacres of Barrios Altos versus Peru (of 14.03.2001), of Caracazo versus Venezuela 
(reparations, of 29.08.2002), of Plan de Sánchez versus Guatemala (of 29.04.2004), 
of 19 Tradesmen versus Colombia (of 05.07.2004), of Mapiripán versus Colombia (of 
17.09.2005), of Moiwana Community versus Suriname (of 15.06.2005), of Pueblo Bello 
versus Colombia (of 31.01.2006), of Ituango versus Colombia (of 01.07.2006), of Montero 
Aranguren and Others (Retén de Catia) versus Venezuela (of 05.07.2006), of Prison of Castro 
Castro versus Peru (of 25.11.2006), and of La Cantuta versus Peru (of 29.11.2006)61. 
This late jurisprudential development would, in all likelihood, have been 
unthinkable of, four decades ago, by the draftsmen of the American Convention. 
Nowadays, massacres no longer fall into oblivion. Atrocities victimizing 
whole communities, or segments of the population, are being brought before 
contemporary international tribunals, for the establishment not only of the 
international criminal responsibility of individuals (in the case of international 
criminal tribunals), by also of the international responsibility of States (in the case 
of international human rights tribunals, such as the IACtHR). This indicates that 
there have been clear advances in the realization of international justice in recent 
years, in cases of factual and evidenciary complexities.
2. Pleadings before the International Court of Justice
May I now turn to the pertinent practice before the ICJ along the years, with 
special attention turned to the pleadings before the Court. In the first Nuclear 
61As well as cases of planified murders at the highest level of State power, and perpetrated by order 
of this latter (such as the case of Myrna Mack Chang versus Guatemala, Judgment of 25.11.2003). 
Cf. A.A. Cançado Trindade, “Reminiscencias de la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos 
en cuanto a Su Jurisprudencia en Materia de Reparaciones” [The Hague, ICC Symposium, 
10.11.2009], 21 Revista de Derecho Vox Juris - Facultad de Derecho de la Universidad de San Martín 
de Porres - Peru (2011) pp. 53-72; and cf. also, inter alia, e.g., G. Citroni, “La Jurisprudencia de 
la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos en Casos de Masacres”, 21 Anuario de Derecho 
Internacional (2005) pp. 1-26. And cf., recently, A.A. Cançado Trindade, The Access of Individuals 
to International Justice, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2011, ch. X, pp. 179-191; A.A. Cançado 
Trindade, State Responsibility in Cases of Massacres: Contemporary Advances in International Justice 
(Inaugural Address, 10.11.2011), Utrecht, Universiteit Utrecht, 2011, pp. 1-71.
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Tests cases (atmospheric testing, Australia and New Zealand versus France, 1973-
1974), the right of peoples to live in peace was acknowledged and asserted before 
the International Court of Justice (ICJ). For the purposed of our exercise today, 
the arguments of the parties, in the written and oral phases of the proceedings, 
are particularly significant, even more than the actual outcome of the cases. In 
its application instituting proceedings (of 09.05.1973), for example, Australia 
contended that it purported to protect its people and the peoples of other nations, 
and their descendants, from the threat to life, health and well-being arising from 
potentially harmful radiation generated from radio-active fall-out generated by 
nuclear explosions62.
New Zealand, on its part, went even further in its own application instituting 
proceedings (also of 09.05.1973): it stated that
“In the period of 27 years in which nuclear tests have taken place there has 
been a progressive realization of the dangers which they present to life, to health 
and to the security of peoples and nations everywhere. (...) The attitude of the 
world community towards atmospheric nuclear testing has sprung from the 
hazards to the health of present and future generations involved in the dispersal 
over wide areas of the globe of radioactive fallout. (...) With regard to nuclear 
weapons tests that give rise to radioactive fallout, world opinion has repeatedly 
rejected the notion that any nation has the right to pursue its security in a 
manner that puts at risk the health and welfare of other people”63. 
New Zealand made clear that it was pleading on behalf not only of its own 
people, but also of the peoples of the Cook Islands, Niue and the Tokelau Islands64. 
In its memorial on jurisdiction and admissibility (of 29.10.1973), New Zealand 
further argued that “the atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons inevitably arouses the 
keenest sense of alarm and antagonism among the peoples and governments of the 
region in which the tests are carried out”65. Moreover, in its request (of 14.05.1973) 
for the indication of provisional measures of protection, New Zealand recalled two 
precedents (in 1954 and 1961) of threats to peoples’ right to live in peace:
“(...) Although in 1954 the dangers associated with nuclear testing 
were less well understood than they are now, the damage caused 
by the hydrogen bomb tests conducted by the United States in the 
Marshall Islands in that year led to vigorous protest by and on behalf 
of the peoples of the Trust Territory and by Japan in respect of injuries 
suffered by her own citizens on the high seas. Similarly, in October 
1961, the explosion by the Soviet Union in her own territory of a 50-
megaton nuclear weapon was strongly condemned by the whole world, 
62It further referred to the populations being subjected to mental stress and anxiety generated 
by fear; ICJ, Nuclear Tests cases (Australia versus France, vol. I) - Pleadings, Oral Arguments, 
Documents, pp. 11 and 14.
63ICJ, Nuclear Tests cases (New Zealand versus France, vol. II) - Pleadings, Oral Arguments, 
Documents, p. 7.
64Ibid., pp. 4 and 8.
65Ibid., p. 211.
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but especially by northern hemisphere countries which were subjected 
to marked increases in radiation as a consequence of the tests”66. 
Thus, beyond the strict confines of the purely inter-State contentieux before 
the ICJ, both New Zealand and Australia looked beyond it, and vindicated to 
rights of peoples to health, to well-being, to be free from anxiety and fear, in sum, 
to live in peace. Two decades later, the matter was brought to the fore again, in 
the mid-nineties, in the second Nuclear Tests cases (undergroung testing, New 
Zealand versus France, 1995). Although this time only New Zealand was the 
applicant State (as from its request of 21.08.1995), five other States lodged with 
the ICJ applications for permission to intervene67: Australia, Solomon Islands, 
Micronesia, Samoa and Marshall Islands.
Australia argued (on 23.08.1995) that the dispute between New Zealand 
versus France raised the issue of the observance of obligations erga omnes (pars. 
18-20, 24-25 and 33-34). On their part, Solomon Islands, Micronesia, Samoa 
and Marshall Islands contended (on 24.08.1995) that “the independent island 
States which are members of the South Pacific Forum have consistent opposed 
activity related to nuclear weapons and nuclear waste disposal in their Region, 
for example, by seeking to establish and guarantee the status of the Region as a 
nuclear-free zone” (par. 5). And, in referring to the need of fulfilment of rights 
and obligations erga omnes (pars. 20 and 25), they added that
“(...) The cultures, traditions and well-being of the peoples of the 
South Pacific States would be adversely affected by the resumption of 
French nuclear testing within the region in a manner incompatible 
with applicable legal norms” (par. 25). 
As a matter of fact, so far there is not much in the ICJ Judgments themselves 
on the peoples’ right to peace, though the subject has at times been brought to the 
Court’s attention. This has a significance, which should not pass unnoticed in the 
present occasion. To recall yet another example, in its Judgment of 22.12.1986 
in the case of the Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso versus Republic of Mali), the ICJ 
Chamber, in drawing the frontier line as requested by the parties (par. 148), took 
note of their contentions, inter alia, concerning the modus vivendi of the people 
living in four villages in the region (farming, land cultivation, pasturage, fisheries68. 
Two Separate Opinions were appended to the aforementioned Judgment of the 
ICJ Chamber: one invoked considerations of equity infra legem, bearing in mind 
that the region concerned is “a nomadic one, subject to drought, so that access 
to water is vital”69; the other asserted that “it is the right of peoples to determine 
their own future which has received the blessing of international law”70. 
66 Ibid., p. 54.
67Under the terms of Article 62 of the ICJ Statute.
68 Pars. 114-116 and 124-125. 
69Separate Opinion of Judge ad hoc Abi-Saab, par. 17.
70 Separate Opinion of Judge ad hoc Luchaire, par. I.
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Other pertinent examples of resort to peoples’ rights before the ICJ 
could here be briefly recalled. In the course of the proceedings (of 1988-
1990) in the case of Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru versus Australia), 
for example, the ICJ took cognizance of successive contentions invoking 
peoples’ rights71 (e.g., over their natural resources72), and their modus 
vivendi73. Furthermore, in its Advisory Opinion of 16.10.1975 on Western 
Sahara, the ICJ itself utilized the expression “right of peoples” (par. 55), in 
the framework of the application of the “principle of self-determination” 
(pars. 55, 59, 138 and 162). 
 Two decades later, in the case concerning East Timor (Portugal versus 
Australia, Judgment of 30.06.1995), although the ICJ found that it had no 
jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the dispute (a decision much discussed in expert 
writing), yet it acknowledged the rights of peoples to self-determination (par. 29) 
and to permanent sovereignty over their natural resources (par. 33), and added 
that “the principle of self-determination of peoples” has been recognized by the 
U.N. Charter and in its own jurisprudence as “one of the essential principles of 
contemporary international law” (par. 29). 
3. Contribution of the Case-Law and Practice in Other 
International Jurisdictions
In this key-note address, I have - as already indicated - deliberately concentrated 
myself on developments under the two international tribunals that I have had, and 
currently have, the privilege to serve, namely, the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights, and now the International Court of Justice. This does not hinder me to 
referring very briefly to pertinent developments under the European Convention 
of Human Rights74 and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. I limit 
myself to refer to them, as a closer examination of such developments is beyond the 
purposes of the present address.
On the African continent, the draftsment of the 1981 African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights opted - as well known - for the inclusion of a catalogue 
of civil and political rights, added to economic, social and cultural rights75, as well 
as peoples’ rights (Articles 19-24), with a common mechanism of implementation 
(Articles 46-59). Until now (end of 2009), the African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights has had the occasion to pronounce on peoples’ rights (infra), but it 
is most likely that the recently-established African Court on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights (AfComHPR) will also have the opportunity to give its own contribution to 
the matter in the foreseeable future. 
71ICJ, Case concerning Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru versus Australia, vol. I) - Pleadings, 
Oral Arguments, Documents, pp. 14, 16, 21, 87, 113 and 185.
72Ibid., pp. 183 and 196.
73 Ibid., pp. 113 and 117.
74Cf., inter alia, e.g., M.D. Goldhaber, A People´s History of the European Court of Human 
Rights, New Brunswick/London, Rutgers University Press, 2009, pp. 1-185. 
75Articles 3-14 and 15-18, respectively.
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As for the African Commission, the decision taken in its 33rd ordinary 
session, in the inter-State case76 of the Democratic Republic of Congo versus Burundi, 
Rwanda of Uganda (May 2003)77, is of relevance here. The complainant State 
alleged “grave and massive violations” of human and peoples’ rights, committed in 
its Eastern provinces by the armed forces of the respondent States, in the form of a 
“series of massacres, rapes, mutilations, mass transfers of populations and looting 
of the peoples’ possessions”78. The AfComHPR significantly based its decision on 
relevant and pertinent provisions of both International Human Rights Law and 
International Humanitarian Law79.
The AfComHPR held that there had occurred “flagrant violations” of the 
rights to life and the integrity of the person, in breach of Articles 2 and 4 of the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. Furthermore, the Commission 
found violations of Articles 18(1) and 12(1) and (2) of the Charter, resulting 
from the “mass transfer of persons from the Eastern provinces of the complainant 
State to camps in Rwanda”80. It further condemned the plunder and lootings of 
the natural resources of the Eastern provinces of the Congo81, and found that 
there had been a serious lack of respect for the mortal remains of the victims of 
massacres and for their gravesites, and that the “barbaric” and “reckless” dumping 
and mass burial of those mortal remains (following the massacres) - forbidden 
under Article 34 of Protocol I of 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 - were 
a violation of the Congolese people’s right to cultural development, in breach 
of Articles 60-61 of the African Charter82. The AfComHPR further asserted the 
peoples’ rights to self-determination83, to development (Article 22 of the African 
Charter) and to dispose freely of their wealth and natural resources84. 
In so far as public arbitrations are concerned, reference can be made to the 
award of 18.02.1983 in the Guinea/Guinea Bissau Maritime Delimitation case, 
wherein the peoples’ right to development received judicial recognition. The 
Court of Arbitration found that the case pertained to “the legitimate claims” of 
the parties as developing States, and to “the right of the peoples involved to a level 
of economic and social development which fully preserves their dignity”85.
76This was the first inter-State communication decided by the African Commission.
77 Reproduced in: African Union/Executive Council, Report of the African Commission on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights (2006), doc. EX.CL/279 (IX), of 25-29.06.2006, pp. 111-131.
78Par. 69; there was further complaint of “concentration camps” situated in Rwanda, where people were 
“simply massacred and incinerated in crematories (especially in Bugusera, Rwanda)” (ibid., par. 6). 
79It found that “the killings, massacres, rapes, mutilations and other grave human rights abuses committed 
while the respondent States’ armed forces were still in effective occupation of the Eastern provinces of the 
complainant State” (as from the beginning of August 1998) were “reprehensible”, as well as “inconsistent 
with their objections” under the 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons 
in Time of War (Part III) and Protocol I to the Convention (the precepts of which form part of “the 
general principles of law recognized by African States”; ibid., pars. 78-79). 
80As alleged by the complainant State and not refuted by the respondent State; ibid., par. 81. 
81In contravention of Articles 21-22 of the African Charter; ibid., pars. 90-91 and 94-95.
82Ibid., par. 87.
83Ibid., pars. 68 and 77.
84Ibid., par. 95.
85Ian Brownlie, The Human Right to Development, London, Commonwealth Secretariat (Occasional 
Paper Series), 1989, pp. 1-2, and cf. p. 13 n. 1.
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V. The Peoples’ Right to Peace and the Lessons of History 
Last by not least, it may here be pointed out that, for the consideration 
of peoples’ rights, a wide perspective has been disclosed, over two decades ago, 
not only by the 1986 U.N. Declaration on the Right to Development, but 
also, e.g., by U.N. General Assembly resolutions 32/130, 39/145, 43/113, 
43/114 and 43/125. All these instruments have contributed to focus on 
the promotion and protection of peoples’ rights, and of rights pertaining to 
human collectivities, without losing sight to the search for the causes of their 
breaches, as much as for the settlement and solutions to gross and flagrant 
violations of human rights86. This is of much relevance to the vindication of 
the peoples’ right to peace - among other peoples’ rights - before international 
courts and tribunals.
The supporters of the peoples’ right to peace, among whom I rank myself, 
ought ultimately to bear in mind the lessons learned by previous generations 
through suffering. The lessons of history ought to be passed on to the present and 
future generations. In this respect, may I here briefly recall a couple of recollections 
which do have a bearing on the consideration of the subject which gathers us here 
today at the United Nations headquarters in Geneva. On the eve of the outbreak 
of the II world war, one of the historians who witnessed the events of that time 
(J. Huizinga) pondered, in an outburst, that the return to barbarism seemed to 
enslave the human spirit, and that barbarism managed to associate itself to high 
technical progress87; to him, civilization required the preservation of the interior 
and spiritual life of each individual88. 
Shortly after the II world war, another learned historian (A.J. Toynbee), 
whose penetrating writings defy the erosion of time, pondered:
“(...) The works of artists and men of letters outlive the deeds of 
businessmen, soldiers, and statesmen. (...) The ghosts of Agamemnon 
and Pericles haunt the living world of today by grace of the magic words 
of Homer and Thucydides (...). The experience that we were having 
in our world now had been experienced by Thucydides in his world 
already. (...)  Thucydides, it now appeared, had been over this ground 
before. He and his generation had been ahead of me and mine in the 
stage of historical experience that we had respectively reached; in fact, his 
present had been my future. But this made nonsense of the chronological 
86A.A. Cançado Trindade, “Environment and Development: Formulation and Implementation 
of the Right to Development as a Human Right”, 3 Asian Yearbook of International Law (1994) 
p. 36, and cf. pp. 15-40; and cf. also A.A. Cançado Trindade, “Relations between Sustainable 
Development and Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Recent Developments Rights”, in 
International Legal Issues Arising under the United Nations Decade of International Law (eds. N. 
Al-Nauimi and R. Meese), The Hague, Kluwer, 1995, pp. 1051-077.
87J. Huizinga, La Crisi della Civiltà, 2nd. ed., Torino, G. Einaudi Ed., 1938, pp. 136-137.
88Ibid., p. 147.
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notation which registered my world as `modern’ and Thucydides’ world 
as `ancient’. Whatever chronology might say, Thucydides’ world and 
my world had now proved to be philosophically contemporary. (...) The 
prophets, through their own experience, anticipated Aeschylus’ discovery 
that learning comes through suffering - a discovery which we, in our 
time and circumstances, have been making too. (...) Civilizations rise 
and fall and, in falling, give rise to others, (...) and (...) the learning that 
comes through the suffering caused by the failures of civilizations may be 
the sovereign means of progress”89. 
Regarding himself as an individual as a “trustee for all future generations”, 
and warning that “the atom bomb and our many other new lethal weapons are 
capable, in another war, of wiping out not merely the belligerents but the whole 
of the human race”90, A.J. Toynbee added that
“(...) In each of (...) civilizations, mankind (...) is trying to rise above 
mere humanity (...) towards some higher kind of spiritual life. (...) The 
goal (...) has never been reached by any human society. It has, perhaps, 
been reached by individual men and women. (...) But if there have been 
a few transfigured men and women, there has never been such a thing 
as a civilized society. Civilization, as we know it, is a movement and 
not a condition, a voyage and not a harbour. No known civilization has 
ever reached the goal of civilization yet.(...)”91. 
Toynbee then regretted that mankind had “unfortunately (...) discovered 
how to tap atomic energy before we have succeeded in abolishing the institution 
of war. Those contradictions and paradoxes in the life of the world in our time (...) 
look like symptoms of serious social and spiritual sickness”92. And he concluded 
that “man’s only dangers (...) have come from man himself ”; after all, we are faced 
with the truths that “in this world we do learn by suffering”, and that “life in this 
world is not an end in itself and by itself ”93. 
 A.A.C.T.
_______________________ 
89A.J. Toynbee, Civilization on Trial, Oxford, University Press, 1948, pp. 5, 7-8 and 15.
90Ibid., pp. 27 and 25.
91Ibid., p. 55.
92 Ibid., pp. 160-161.
93 Ibid., pp. 162 and 260.
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